Page 16 - IDEA Studie 11 2018 Dopady vyssich platu politiku

Použitá literatura Besley, Tim (2004), “Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 193–215. Calonico, Sebastian, Matias Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik (2014), “Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression‐Discontinuity Designs,” Econometrica, 82, 2295- 2326. Caselli, Francesco, and Massimo Morelli (2004), “Bad Politicians,” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 759–782. Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan (2009), “Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance,” NBER Working Papers 14906, available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14906 Fisman, Raymond, Nikolaj Harmon, Emir Kamenica, Inger Munk (2015), “Labour Supply of Politicians,”Journal of the European Economic Association, 13, 871–905 Gagliarducci, Stefano, and Tommaso Nannicini (2013), “Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 369–398. Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni (2011), “Electoral Rules and Politicians Behavior: a Micro Test,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3, 144–174. IDEA (2017), „Kdo je váš starosta: volební soutěž a charakteristiky zastupitelů v ČR“, Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, Czech Republic. Kotakorpi, Kaisa and, Panu Poutvaara (2011), “Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: an Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 95, 877 – 885. Mattozzi, Andrea, and Antonio Merlo (2008), “Political Careers or Careers Politicians,” Journal of Public Economics, 92, 597–608. Mattozzi, Andrea, and Antonio Merlo (2015), “Mediocracy,” Journal of Public Economics, 130, 32–44. 14