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Study 14 / 2016

 Political Competition in Local Governments
              and Public Procurement2

                                                OCTOBER 2016

                                                 JÁN PALGUTA

                                     Summary

  Municipalities in the Czech Republic manage 23.9% of the total public expenditure
      (approximately 10% of the GDP), with approximately half of these funds redistributed
      through public procurement. This is a very significant amount of public resources that
      should be given due attention.

  This analysis demonstrates that the composition of municipal governments significantly
      influences the process of public procurement. Our methodology allows to interpreting
      the estimated relationships as causal, rather than as mere correlations.

  Municipalities with broader party representation open the tenders for public contracts
      to a wider range of suppliers and achieve lower contract prices. At the same time, public
      contracts are less often awarded to companies which make donations to political
      parties. Our methodology, however, does not allow to distinguishing whether our
      results stem from more intensive competition for public contracts or they are a
      consequence of suppressed conflict of interest of elected officials due to a closer mutual
      scrutiny within local governments.

  The impact of broader party representation in local governments on public procurement
      is evident especially when political candidates fiercely compete in local elections and the
      elections produce very close results between the strongest political parties.

  Our findings are important for considerations of prospective changes in the Czech
      electoral system and regulation of political parties.

2 This IDEA study received support from the research programme Strategy AV21 of the Czech Academy
of Sciences. The study uses more detailed findings published in the academic paper: “Political Rent-
Seeking in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Entry of Political Challengers at Electoral Thresholds“.

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